US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (R), and Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L) attend a press conference in the US Department of State headquarters.
Photo: Yury Gripas
| Other Photos |
 |
|
 |
Stalemate in Disguise of Concessions
There was nothing new in Washington’s statements about the CFE ratification. Just as there are no concessions. It is the US tactic maneuvering which is now strongly criticized not only by Russia, but also by European public. Just think of the very essence of the offer enunciated by the US Assistant Secretary of State. That is, the U.S. is ready to launch the CFE ratification process, but only if Russia fulfills a number of questionable commitments. At the same time, there are no guarantees on the US part. The Bush administration does not miss the chance to remind that everything concerning the CFE issue is in the Senate’s power.
Now to the treaty itself. The Warsaw Pact and NATO countries that signed it in 1990 agreed to introduce quotas on five types of armaments for each party. However, the Warsaw Pact fell apart, and a number of its former members lined up to join NATO. Consequently, the CFE was revised in 1999, and is now called the Adapted CFE. Then, the NATO expansion process went on: the alliance let in the Baltic countries. Moreover, several states of former Yugoslavia now want to join NATO. Other possible applicants to the alliance are Ukraine and Georgia.
First, a new round of talks is necessary here. Second, the U.S. sets an unfeasible ultimatum to Russia by linking the CFE ratification with the demand to withdraw Russian troops from Georgia and Transdniestria. I headed the working group at the summit in Istanbul in 1999. I can confirm that the two joint statements signed by Russia with Georgia and with Moldova really helped the Adapted CFE’s success. The current situation is such that Russia will completely withdraw from Georgia by the end of the year. Meanwhile, the situation in Transdniestria is absolutely different. There are huge deposits of armaments and ammunition. Moreover, the ammunition’s expiry date passed long time ago. Russia keeps forces of around 1,500 people there, just to guard that unsafe military equipment so as to prevent technogenic disaster. There also is a political reason: the current Transdniestrian authorities do not agree to the armaments removal. And here is the U.S. setting an ultimatum to Russia. It is a cunning and perfidious position.
Acting this way, the U.S. leads an information and politics game around the CFE. What is it about? I suppose the U.S. does not want to lose Russia as a partner in many strategic issues, including the Middle East, Iran, and European issues. Washington is afraid that its tough approach to Russia linked to the missile defense and to the CFE, might force Russia’s foreign policy to turn in a different direction, which is actually happening now. Consequently, Moscow will move to the camp of US opponents. However, Washington does not want such scenario. Yet, while unwilling to let Russia out of the orbit of its policy, the U.S. does not want to surrender political victory to Russia in the CFE or the missile defense issues.
Thus, their concessions presented as something new is a disguised stalemate.
Leonid Ivashov, president of the Russian Geopolitical Studies Academy
All the Article in Russian as of Nov. 07, 2007
|
|
|
