Russia’s trenchant policy to regain its influence in former Soviet republics only increases domestic demand on more resolute measures, which does not let Moscow opt for other strategies even though flaws of this scheme are getting increasing noticeable. Tanks carry Georgian flags at a military parade marking in Tbilisi.
Photo: AP
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Russia’s Diplomacy Hits It from the Inside
// Crackdown on CIS citizens will inflame nationalism in Russia
The real cause of the Russian-Georgian crisis does not lie in the arrest of Russian officers accused of spying. Nor is it in differences over the future of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It revolves around Russia’s ambitions in the Caucasus and, on the other hand, around the striving to regain influence over all former Soviet countries.
Tensions mounted in the CIS after a series of Colored Revolutions had rocked the former Soviet republics – starting in Kiev and Tbilisi. New authorities dismissed the system where Russia was the unofficial patron of CIS nations. The concept of limited sovereignty in relation to the CIS meant that close economic links and energy supplies at low prices would let Russia control foreign policies of these countries, primarily their membership in other economic and political alliances.
The steps that Russian authorities have taken at this stage of conflict – fully blockading Georgia and applying pressure on the Georgian community in Russia – are extraordinary for non-war time. Still, these measures are quite in line with Moscow’s actions in recent years. Energy pressure, trade blockade and an attempt to cut money flows from Russia preceded the crisis. All these steps intend to show the CIS’s economic dependence on Russia and lead Russian-friendly political forces back in office. Massive pressure on the Georgian community in Russia was supposed to disrupt trust in President Saakashvili in Georgia and rally the frightened community together to oppose him.
Russia is not the first country to try to declare a region closed for geopolitical penetration of other countries. Actions that the Kremlin takes interfering in elections in Ukraine or trying to overthrow a hostile regime are reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine. U.S. President James Monroe declared 120 years ago that European powers should not interfere with the affairs in the Western hemisphere. By the end of the 19th century the United States considered it its right and obligation to regulate relations of Latin American states with other nations as well as political conflicts inside the countries. Historians have estimated that since 1846 Americans have resorted to direct interventions into Latin American states 30 times and have held at least 47 covert operations, including blockades, economic pressure, supporting friendly forces, masterminding plots and murder attempts.
The policy of limited sovereignty, once effective in relations to Latin American countries, started to break down in the 20th century. Latin American regimes first sought succor in Germany, then in the USSR to become more independent of Washington. The United States, however, thought that any signs of independence from them are caused only by external schemes. For instance, an uprising in Mexico in 1926 was accounted for the Soviet conspiracy. It sounded more like paranoia then, but during WWII a number of Latin American countries indeed made advances to Nazi Germany.
As a result, support of external forces (namely, the USSR) has made it impossible for the USA to overthrow the hostile regime on Cuba. But, more importantly, decades of American interference have nurtured staunch anti-American sentiment in the region. Latin America is almost lost for the United States as a zone of influence. Toppling the hostile leaders like Hugo Chavez is not enough to make amends. It seems Russia has hardly more chances to get Georgia and Ukraine back into its influence zone. There are, however, some chances to destabilize domestic situations there. Given the open support of the United States and the European Union, those steps can be anything but effective. One has to keep it in mind that the Monroe Doctrine worked in an absolutely different world on the continent, separated by the ocean.
More likely, this unprecedented pressure will sour Russia’s relations with the West and further corrode the CIS. Ironically, the only win that Moscow gets in the conflict with Georgia is the victory of revanchist and nationalistic sentiment inside Russia. “I suppose that opinion polls will soon show that at least 60 percent of Russians support authorities’ actions,” Lev Gudkov from Levada Center says. As a result not only anti-Georgian sentiment will rise but so will other anti-Caucasus, anti-foreign and other sentiments, the expert believes. “So, we see that this country has been rallying together for the last three years only around political aggression against foreigners – there is no other pivot,” he says. Russia’s trenchant policy to regain its influence in former Soviet republics – which has not been by any means successful so far – only increases domestic demand on more resolute measures, which does not let Moscow opt for other strategies even though flaws of this scheme are getting increasing noticeable.
www.kommersant.com
All the Article in Russian as of Oct. 06, 2006
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